READING THE AF-PAK NARRATIVE, FROM THE US DISENGAGEMENT TO RUSSIAN RE-ENGAGEMENT

: The US has prolonged its stay in Afghanistan with the security situation remaining far from improving. The indefatigable demand for resources to maintain counter-insurgency operations was a major debate in 2016 US Presidential elections with a demand for an earlier withdrawal from America’s trillion dollars plus war effort. Russians having sensed the weakening of the US inﬂ uence warmed upto the idea of new Afghan situation involving Taliban and their masters, the Pakistan army. Russia had experienced vulnerabilities of Islamisation in Central Asia and Caucasus, and the ISIS brand radicalisation added to the fear of political destabilisa- tion of Central Asian states. The Islamic State showed up in Afghanistan and Pakistan as ISIS-Khorasan branch. Russia needed Pakistan as an ally to ﬁ ght Daesh’s presence on its southern periphery. However, there remained many intertwined security challenges that complicate the South Asian geo- politics, especially, the Af-Pak region. Russia’s Taliban policy might be the hitherto unused leverage that it might be using in order to strike balance all along the shatter belt.


Introduction
The trilateral summit held in December 2016 in Moscow dwelling upon the security situation in Afghanistan expressed heightened concern from the stake holders working with the Kabul government. The US got riled over the perfervid camaraderie shown by Islamabad and Beijing to Moscow's overture. The initiative was in consonance with the Russia's stated policy to counter ISIS in Levante and prohibit its choleric rise all along its periphery. This CIS-Eurasian periphery also delineated as 'shatterbelt' by political geographers represents a vast expanse of Turko-Arab Muslim tribes. 1 The major threat from the Islamic State (ISIS) to Afghanistan was recognized when the organization signalled new franchise, Velayat Khorasan (Khorasan province, or ISIS-KP) focussing on Afghanistan. The consequences of Syrian confl ict affected the prospects of peace and stability in Afghanistan. It was the same set of state interests that fought against each other in the Cold war found themselves now pitted against one another in Syria. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, the Euro-Atlantic West have been supporting wide range of rebels in Syria ranging from Free Syrian Army to the ISIS-Al-Qaeda infested Al-Nusra front. Cold war witnessed the same side supporting Mujahideens led by Haft-e Shura, the resistance council based in Peshawar that included Hizb-I Islami (notably, Hekmatyar) factions and Jamat-I Islami (Rabbani-led) among the prominent ones.
The US remained brazenly exposed in Syria where the Obama administration and the EU fully backed Turkey and Saudi Arabia for material support to the ISIS and other anti-Syrian government militia in hope of getting Assad regime removed. Turkey provided them offer of citizenship in lieu of their recruitment in Daesh for fi ghting in Syria and Iraq. 2 Russia remained defi ant to these designs and provided logistics to Syrian government and the necessary COMPARATIVE POLITICS, RUSSIA . 2017 Vol.8 No. 4 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА И ГЕОПОЛИТИКА air power for destroying the oil economy of these anti-Syrian government groups. The US-led West and the Russian interests clashed in Syria that led to a stalemate in the Syrian situation. The Trump administration seemed to step aside Obama's Middle East policies lent hope for a cooperative solution made a shocking U-turn with raining down 59 cruise missiles on Sharyat Airbase operated by Syrian Government. 3 The US wheeling around with the obsession of regime change has led to unending spiral of confl ict in Levante and that has affected its long-term engagements, such as, in Afghanistan. Afghanistan compared to Syria represented a stark contrast where Russia had actually approved of the US's effort to eliminate Al-Qaeda-Taliban regime in the aftermath of the 9/11. In fact, Afghanistan was the only place where the US and Russia agreed more than anywhere else. The NATO forces relied heavily on the Russian controlled Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to connect with Afghan deployments for major source of supplies and later as a returning route for the 2014 drawdown. The change of regime in the US after the Democrats lost the Presidential race raised speculation for a total withdrawal from Afghanistan. But, then Trump administration made another U-turn by using the MOAB non-nuclear bomb on IS-location in Nangerhar in April 2017. Former Afghan President, Hamid Karzai criticized the use of such weapons and shamed the US for using Afghan soil as testing ground of its weapons inventory. 4 This raised the speculation whether the US President Trump intended to bring home the troops that were sent abroad under the major macro-securitization paradigm. The US hadn't abandoned its priorities in Afghanistan post-2014 with the necessary air support provided to Afghan forces staging ground operations. However, the interest kept diminishing due to intransigent situation where Taliban raised battle costs with ever rising wave of violence in the north and the south. This coupled with the marked deterioration of the US-Pakistan relations made the US presence in Afghanistan a dimensionless affair. Amid these doldrums, Russian overtures to Pakistan with reference to Afghan situation raised a few eyebrows among the stake holders.
The Russians had a long history of distrust and apathy towards Pakistan since the Cold war period, when Pakistan became a member of CENTO, a Cold war military block. South Asian geopolitics had Indo-Soviet friendship as a big determining factor for India had been purchasing Russian arms since the Soviet times and the legacy of strategic ties were the widest of frameworks between the two countries ranging from joint production of advance weapons to military exchanges. Russia's engagement in South Asia largely marked with the Indo-Soviet friendship that served as beacon to Nehruvian era of Non-Aligned Movement. The Soviets valued India's support against the perennial hostility of the West and reciprocally, India was the benefactor of Soviet permanent membership at the UN, where any attempt to internationalize the Kashmir issue was vetoed by the Soviet Union on numerous occasions. The Russians have valued Indian factor in Afghan geopolitics as the latter has a great goodwill among common Afghans, who saw India as their second home. Russia worked with India and Iran in thwarting Taliban in 1990s when there was serious threat to the minorities in northern Afghanistan and their further incursions into the neighbouring Central Asian republics. Russia has been particularly wary of narco-terrorism that could potentially destabilize the CIS states. The jihadist elements used opium cultivation for garnering resources to fund terror training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both, Russia and India saw narcoterror and militant Islam as threat to regional stability and shared great deal of common understanding about the future of Afghanistan. Iran's concerns for Shia Hazaras persecuted by Taliban made it a common cause with the two. The US-led West supported the rise of Taliban after the fall of Rabbani government that soon turned into a phenomenon of Sunni religious extremism and narco-terrorism later termed as the Talibanization of the Af-Pak region. 5 62 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА . 2017 Т.8 № 4

СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА И ГЕОПОЛИТИКА
The efforts to recognize Taliban as a legitimate force in political participation that could outmanoeuvre ISIS appeared a new thinking by Russia, China and Pakistan exploring a common ground vis-à-vis the US. Taliban without Talibanization remained an important caveat to such an alliance that hadn't so far explained the Russian policy overtures. India and Iran haven't abandoned their concerns on Talibanization as their interests remain unchanged. The new narrative didn't distract from the manifold complexities of Taliban movement, which had been a multi-headed and multi-interest amorphous coalition of fi ghters. Taliban hadn't been proved to be another pawn in the US-Russian war along the Eurasian periphery. The Russians came out open about their contacts with Taliban only to brief their intention of inclusivity of the process. Taliban had been operating through their Doha, Qatar offi ce since 2013 and depended on their patrons in the Middle East, who coincidentally happened to be the primary funders of ISIS in Levante. The US maintained liaison with the Taliban leaders released from Guantanamo Bay prison and pushed for amicable solution between the Karzai government and the ranks of Taliban. But, Taliban who befooled the Americans by sending the fake interlocutors appeared to be very slimy stuff who could even now walk out at any stage negotiation jeopardizing the Moscow initiative. 6 Negotiations with Taliban could possibly work out as Pakistan sought to weaken the threat from Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP); a group that operated across Durand line after being pushed by military Operations of Pak army. The sympathizers of TTP, the Deobandi cleric of Pakistan openly declared allegiance to Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the Caliph of ISIS. 7 Russia might have to undertake a lot of hair-splitting decisions on Taliban groups as Pakistan regularly shifted the red lines between the 'good' and the 'bad' Taliban, based on transformation of confl ict in the Af-Pak buffer around Durand line.
The duality of macro-and micromanagement of confl ict in Afghanistan could strain Russia beyond its economic capability and geopolitical willingness. The April 2017 attack by Taliban on 209 Shaheen corps headquarters in Balkh costed lives of almost 160 troops out of which nearly 100 were from Takhar and Badakhshan alone, which indicated that mostly they were Tajiks. 8 The growing suspicion about an insider attack could potentially lead to mistrust and ethnic discontent in armed forces that would be catastrophic for Afghanistan; as sensing the unhappiness both the Army chief and Defence Minister promptly resigned. Russia had Tajiks and Uzbeks from northern Alliance as traditional partners in post-Najibullah Afghanistan. Russia would be risking apathy and anger of its erstwhile protagonists, notably, the Tajiks and Uzbeks, who would see these attacks as threat to their political existence. Ismail Khan, one of the most seasoned leader and former mujahedeen commander hailing from Herat cautioned as early as of January 2017 that if Moscow conferences meant the re-empowerment of Taliban, then it would be used as a pawn between the Great Power rivalries turning Afghanistan into another battlefi eld like Aleppo, in Syria. The Russians would be inclined to use Taliban as a deterrent force against the US military presence that countered the Russian security interest in the Middle East. 9 The paper set out with the aim of making an assessment of Russian pragmatism in Afghan situation and the possible implications for the South Asian geopolitics. Russian presence in South Asia allowed balance of great power interest in the region. Russia's quest for strategic objectives in Afghanistan could be a unilateral approach partially shared by Pakistan, who would use it as an opportunity for seeking bargains vis-à-vis India. The paper looks into comparative situations of Russian engagement during cold war period and now in a different matrix. Russia and the US both have major realignments towards India and Pakistan, which has transformed South Asian security complex. The paper in the end argues that Russia has diffi cult choices in supporting Taliban and pitting South Asia against Middle East crisis could turn out to be a faux pas for Russia. COMPARATIVE POLITICS, RUSSIA . 2017 Vol.8 No. 4

The US goals post-2014
The US had announced withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan by 2014, but not before securing at least a handful of operational bases that could still sustain formidable military presence in the country. The surge and a drawdown were announced by Obama administration in 2009 as a part of stabilizing the situation. However, the expectations were belied due to continued low-intensity confl ict in the south and the east of Afghanistan. The US got dismayed with the fact that the EU under NATO framework had not been forthcoming enough as combat force and this largely was responsible for the military fatalities being largely American. 10 Before demitting the White House, Obama administration decided to maintain troop level at around 9.000 as a pause to steady reduction that would have seen only 5.000 US troops by 2017. The fi gures of 2015-16 indicated the troop combat mortality reduced substantially with the reduction in deployment but the extra-ordinary rise in civilian casualties indicated the threat to governance. The years of 2015 and 2016 could be considered worse in terms of loss of Afghan lives as nearly 3500 civilian lives were lost in each year with the children being one third of them. Almost 60.000 civilians have died in Afghanistan since the 2009 surge. 11 This signifi ed the lack of any improvement in security situation given the persistent resistance by Taliban and sparsely distributed security framework contributed to more casualties of Afghan forces. The NATO allies committed to Afghan cause operate under a framework defi ned by Operation Resolute Support. 12 The goals remained elusive as the ground situation worsened steadily since drawdown. But, the Afghan confl ict appeared to be an extra-territorial affair given the fact that cross-border operations gained focus in the aftermath of withdrawal. The US presence carried geopolitical signifi cance that restrained Taliban to re-arm and re-group on a massive scale just like in 1990's for major assault. 10  The triadic arrangement of US-Afghanistan-Pakistan initiative failed due to lack of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the one hand between Pakistan and the US on the other. The latter set of relations nose-dived to nadir in 2011 when nearly 25 Pakistani troops were killed by the US airstrike on Durand line. 13 The rise of Daesh proved that the avowed goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al-Qaeda remained elusive as ever in 2017 as well. The new strategy unveiled in 2009 clearly articulated that the "future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbour, Pakistan" and the toponymal identity of Af-Pak emerged. 14 The US-Pak relations have been nettled by the US's changing priorities in South Asia. The cost of staying in Afghanistan was the key consideration as Pakistan remained supportive of Taliban (Quetta Shura) and the Haqqani network as its strategic assets. The problem further complicated with growing uncertainties over funding and training of Afghan security forces as the European Union found itself preoccupied with Brexit, Ukraine crisis and the infl ux of Middle East refugees. The US needed Pakistan's goodwill at all cost to survive post-2014 security scenario. But, the US prorogued Pakistan's geopolitical goals on Kashmir issue and hastened latter's bandwagon with China to make up for the loss of strategic advantage. The US, India and the Afghan government made a common cause against Pakistan's support of terror groups detrimental to their security interests. The lack of strategy for larger regional solution to deal with Afghan crisis had been the missing element in the Obama administration and the newly arrived Trump administration as well. The US has been more fascinated with oneon-one dealing with the adversary. And, so long Al-Qaeda and Taliban remained a visible threat it suited the design of scaling up the assault. But, the political solution kept evading due to inadequate thinking about several coaxial bilateral issues that impeded any progress. The dealings with Iran on nuclear issue and the larger crisis in 13  region, but it took lives of no less than 500 civilians as collateral damage. 16 The strategic objective of keeping the leadership issue alive and harass them from strategizing is one of the important goals of drone strikes. But, drone strikes one such that killed Mullah Mansur in May 2016 led to further deterioration of the US-Pak relations as these strategic assets were used by Pakistan against the Indian presence in Afghanistan. 17 The US held the premise that once Al-Qaeda is defeated then Afghanistan's mineral wealth and its location for energy transit routes could be exploited for offl oading the fi nancial burden due to prolonged war. The mineral resources wealth was chanted by western media as some asteroidean discovery that awaited 21 st century gold rush would turn the course of war-funding. 18 The mining and mineral activity demanded security in countryside, where Taliban threatened any investment. The US welcomed Chinese and Indian initiative to invest in Afghan economy. The work on Ainak copper (China) and Hajigak iron mines (India) has been albeit slow, demonstrated possibilities of regional solution to Afghan situation. But, the Chinese investments in Afghanistan area based on arterial extension to its investments in Central Asia and Pakistan, whereas the Indian investments could be seen as the US-Afghan government preference to balance the Sino-Pak infl uence. The problem of connectivity is linked to security that renders Durand line as a failed border with increasing clash between Afghan and Pak security forces.

Engaging Pakistan and the Indian question
Russia inherited Afghan neighbourhood since the formation of USSR. The interaction between the two states was referred to as the Great Game during 19th-20th centuries. where the nationalist forces themselves were the benefi ciary of Soviet aid and assistance and the common Afghans easily slipped into the hands of cross-border clergy-politicians, who gave a call for holy war. The West's aid to mujahidin proved decisive in the failure of Soviet approach towards Afghan crisis. And, it was for long an established conclusion that in order to isolate the insurgency, economic sops were to be strongly embedded in any counterinsurgency move. The post-9/11 intervention in Afghanistan also adhered to the similar path as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan worked in tandem with ISAF in order to gain trust of the commoners and weaken the support base of Al-Qaeda and Taliban. There has been very little economic component of Russian assistance, which could be partly explained with the fact that Russia has a long legacy of Soviet aid to Afghanistan in 1950s and 60s and perhaps the debacle of 1980s has weighed heavy on the policy formulators restricting and candid overture to Afghanistan. One of the fundamental differences from the previous involvement is the collective approach of Russia with China on post-9/11 Afghanistan and its neighbouring region. This was not the case in 1980s when China was actually opposing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The Chinese were giving training to mujahideen in handling automatic weapons in Miramshah, Pakistan during the cold war period. Pakistan served as the "beachhead of subversion" that hurt the Soviets in 80s, and the training of terrorists and material 19  at Nizhny Panj-Sher Khan has been used by the US for bringing in supplies from Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan route. China has been building 5,253 meter long tunnel on Dushanbe-Khujand-Chanok Highway, which makes it an all-weather road for logistics. 28 Russia considered the Afghan security forces incapable of handling Taliban on their own. This might prolong the US stay in Afghanistan and at the same required attention from Russia that ensured stability in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Russian ambassador to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, himself an Afghan war veteran, said that the failure of the West to improve the political climate of Afghanistan might prompt Russia to act unilaterally in the interest of Central Asian Republics, who were threatened by Taliban offensive in the north, esp., Kunduz, Mazar-I Sharif region. 29 The foremost fear was the use of ISIS in staging coup or a regime change in Central Asian republics. The ISIS felt encouraged when the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) declared allegiance to Abu-Bakr Baghdadi, the self-prophesised Amir of the Islamic State. The Central Asian republics has large out migrating population that works in Turkey and Middle East, where radicalisation is rampant. 30 These migration routes were exploited by Islamic State for channelizing of the funds and the jihaadis. Kyrgyzstan has witnessed maximum instances of Daesh network activities among all the Central Asian republics. The ISIS released its fi rst video footage in July 2015 in Kyrgyzstan quoting Quran and Kyrgyz proverbs. 31 The Daesh has been very particular in exploiting the ethnic cleavages to create mistrust among communities within Central Asian republics that shook the state authorities from slumber. The Tajik  so far as the Middle East is concerned. But, the West behaved in an unsure manner on cooperation with Russia in areas of similar concern; Afghanistan being the next important one. Russia's Afghanistan policy considered Taliban as a party to peace-building in Afghanistan, but it remained inadequate for sequestering Taliban's support to separatist movements in Central Asia. The Uyghur militancy against increasing control of their economy, culture and polity by Chinese government found support from Taliban. The risks in these chance occurrences emanated from the fact that Taliban has been providing shelter to Uyghur separatists, just as many terror groups found safe heavens in Afghanistan. 35 Russia's soft pedaling towards Taliban might create a complex situation if Taliban were ever come to power in Afghanistan. This became cynosure of even Sino-Pak relations as over 200 Taliban and Uyghur militants were arrested near border in prior to 9/11, which indicated the potency of this factor. 36

Engaging Pakistan and the Indian question
The Russian military delegation arrived at Miran Shah in March 2017 at the invitation of Pakistan army for fi rst-hand information about various operations and measures undertaken to salvage the North and the South Waziristan from Taliban insurgency. This was a hitherto unknown gesture by Pakistan towards Russia in handling the Af-Pak narrative. Russian naval warship Severmorsk participated in the International Naval exercise 'Aman', hosted by Pakistan in February 2017. Pakistan has also received Mi-35 ground attack helicopters from Russian in 2015 and in 2016 there was joint special-forces coordination exercise named 'Druzba 2016'. 37 A new chapter in Pakistan-Russia relations began, and the Russians condescendingly acknowledged the 'good' Taliban as legitimate 35 Khamraev, F. "The Xinjiang Factor" and Central Asian Security // Cent. Asia Caucasus, 2003, Vol. 23, No. 5, p. 115. 36  political force in Afghan solution. The 'redlines' enshrined in the Afghanistan Constitution and endorsed by India and the US plus the Afghan government were rejected by Taliban. The Afghan Constitution is pivot to the fundamental principle of inclusiveness for ethnic, sectarian Islamic and gender groups. It would be a challenge for Russia and Pakistan to bring Taliban around these principles towards lasting peace in the region. Russia found goals amenable with Pakistan after it disclosed relations with Taliban in December 2016. Both were sharing intelligence over counter-offensive against the ISIS (Daesh-Khorasan). 38 Russia didn't clarify how it would handle the Daesh presence in Pakistan as Daesh formed an important linkage between Arab Sunni Wahabi seminaries entrenched in tribal areas and their role in Afghanistan remained important counterinsurgency tool for Pakistan army. The Russian understanding about Daesh appeared partial with more concern towards prevention of its spread in Central Asia. But, it needed to factor in the fact that the spread of extremism and radicalism remains channelled through south Afghanistan. The Daesh successfully recruited Uyghurs supporters of Turkestan party and East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) moving through Turkish territory into Syria and Iraq, who also maintained close links with Taliban and Al-Aqeda. 39 The ISIS was welcomed in Pakistan by Tehrik-e-Khalifa Wa Jihad pledged allegiance to ISIS and declared South Asia as goal for Daesh-Khorasan. The ISIS spread paphlets ub Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The fi rst recruit for ISIS came from Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Jundullah army was another group that sought allegiance to ISIS. The Central Asian recruits to ISIS had mainly come from Hizb ul Tahrir, who were lodged in North Waziristan and later moved to Achin district of Nagerhar. 40  Laskhkar-I Jhangwi, Jamat ul Ahrar and other splinter groups, who are actively engaged in cross-border operations in Kashmir also remain in contact with the Islamic State operatives in Pakistan. 41 The arrest of female IS-affi liate in April 2017 from Lahore exposed the gravity of situation as she was a medical student among dozens other female students who went missing. 42 The educated youth getting attracted to Daesh's ideology in Lahore confi rmed that it was no longer a peripheral phenomenon confi ned to Tribal agencies.  46 India had good relations with Daoud as Prime Minister and later as President of Afghanistan. This has been mainly due to his nationalistic agenda of Pashtunistan that had moral support from India on historic and strategic grounds. He said in an interview given to Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar in April 1974 that self-determination is the only way for NWFP (now, KP) Pashtuns and Balochis. And, expected India to side with Afghanistan on this issue. 47 The post-Saur revolution Afghan government maintained smooth ties with India. The 1988 visit of President Najibullah established fi rm footing for the support to PDPA regime, when the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi cautioned on the victory of extremist forces of fundamentalist nature. 48 The Afghan nobility who sided with the PDPA regime sensed the days of Najibullah regime are numbered and therefore chose India to be a destination for safe stay. Thus, Afghan has been home to many Afghans who escaped the harsh regime of Taliban in the aftermath of the fall of PDPA regime. 49 The Indian role in rebuilding Afghan airlines Ariana and providing radar logistics to anti-Taliban regime at Kabul proved sustained interest in the region. In fact, together with India and Iran, Russia had gained sizeable credibility to its action in Afghanistan. This was signifi cant as Pakistan-backed Taliban remained a potent threat to Rabbani regime, whom Russia, India and Iran abhorred. 50 India found Taliban as facilitator to Pakistan's military objectives in the South Asian region. The Taliban guaranteed the swapping of Harkat-ul Mujahidin militants in exchange of the safe return of the Indian Airlines passengers in 1999. 51 The presence of militant training camps in eastern Afghanistan coupled with the presence of Al-Qaeda led multi-national jihadi force raised the threat potential for Indian security. 52 These training areas were located in Kunar and Nangerhar province of Afghanistan, but they also had cross-border continuum places such as, Quetta, Mansehra, Shamshattu, Parachinar and other areas in the FATA territories of Pakistan. 53 India saw Pakistan as vital connect to its security challenges and the situation of confl ict in Afghanistan. Therefore, India putatively became the fi rst country to sign the strategic partnership agreement with the post-9/11 government of Afghanistan in October 2011. Afghanistan has been repeatedly pummelled by the Haqqani network and Quetta Shura terrorists, who serve Pakistan's military interest by raising the costs of securing peace in Afghanistan. India has tried to fi ll the gap by fi nancially assisting Afghan government in training and funding of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 54 India has been looking at Afghanistan from not only strategic point of view, but also from the perspective of state institutions that covalent to the ethos of Indian state too. India decided to support the construction of new Parliament for Wolesi and Meshrano Jirga, the apex bodies of the Afghan government. It has provided logistics for Finance and External Affair Ministry and training of personnel. These have induced strong inter-governmental bond between the Parliamentary institutions of the two states. Russia has had an understanding with the Indian establishment over the need to preserve these institutions as they act as buffer to fi ssiparous tendencies across Central Asian republics. The predicament lies in the growing unease with the US at other points of confl agration, notably, the Levante. This has put Afghanistan in juxtaposition to the Middle East crisis. India as such does not act into the Middle East situation, but Indian diaspora in Gulf countries is the largest presence abroad. Their presence in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE make a complex situation, where these countries have in fact supported and funded the DAESH against the Assad regime. Thus, Russia and India have a few unknown variables that have crept into their relationship. However, India and Russia are on same page so far as confronting the DAESH is concerned because of their possible use as proxies by the hostile states for subversion; India is wary of Pakistan, just as Russia is vary of the US-led camp.

Conclusion
Taliban as a legitimate political movement could not be dissociated from its ontology. The movement was raised of migrant Afghans, who were for larger part of their life remained in 54  Pathun identity polarized the non-Pashtun due to atrocious behaviour in 90s against Hazaras and other minorities. The most putative shared interest of Russia, China and Pakistan in the South Asian region since 9/11 was the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan soon the Taliban and Al-Qaeda threat was over. Although, Russia often underscored the incomplete work left by the West leaving a strategic void, which needed be fi lled through collective security arrangement unlike the US's unilateral approach. The current National Unity Government of Afghanistan (NUGA) hardly found wisdom in Russia's approach having already declared that any peace talks could only be on Afghan soil. The Afghan owned process could only be the legitimate source of any initiative irrespective of the initiator whether the talks were held at Moscow or Doha (the Taliban Headquarters) or in Islamabad. Russia might not be having a preference for Taliban style of politics, but then it might just be the case of situation where Taliban's strategic goal of pushing the US out of Afghanistan gained prime importance for the Russian strategy of handling the US hegemony. Russia would not like to play partisan role at a time when haven't had preference for any faction or ruling group in Afghanistan. This was certainly a case when it tried hard to bargain with the US and Pakistan for saving the then Najibullah government before leaving in 1979 and even later as it supported Northern Alliance against Taliban, who threatened security of the Central Asian states. The US has been miffed by the new rapprochement as it had consistently been in denial mode for roundtable talks initiated by Moscow. The latest round proposed by Moscow on April 14, 2017 was another instance where all Afghan neighbours were been invited and the US has rejected this initiative. One of the bigger challenges for Russia was been to seek a regional integrated framework for Afghanistan security and to avoid bipartisan dealings amongst the largely infl uential powers. This allowed Russia to coopt Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, China and India for an over-arching dialogue. Russia had also engaged European powers, especially Germany for its Afghanistan mission.
The former Afghanistan president Mr. Hamid Karzai had criticised the US presence in Afghanistan having delivered no goods and the Afghan soil being used as testing ground for the US arms industry. The National Unity government would be vulnerable to defections and internal break-down if Karzai's view ever gained currency among Afghan policymakers. Already, the Ghani government had been criticized of not performing in a decisive manner against the corrupt offi cials in the countryside. The ineffective governance might be the immediate issue around which dissatisfaction among common Afghans might grow allowing the willing-to-break-away elements opening upto Taliban's growing presence. The spring offensive of 2017 declared by Taliban indicated their replenished cadres and military inventory. The High Peace Council who couldn't ever achieve any signifi cant whilst its effort to negotiate with Taliban only paved way for strengthening of the Quetta Shura. An important strategy deployed by the US in consonance with the Ghani government had been the drone strikes against the leadership of Taliban. The killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor in 2016 had setback for Taliban offensive against the Aghan govt forces. The Af-Pak region could be construed as another theatre of Great Power politics, where the US and Russia might reach the deadend just as in Levante. The support to Taliban and the US constantly weaning out their leadership might become a never ending spiral leading to deterioration of security situation in Af-Pak region as whole.