CONTRASTING U.S., CHINESE AND RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Abstract: According to realist approach, three most modern influential states Russia, China and US strive to gain maximum freedom in the international arena while retaining independence in domestic policies. The author suggests that a different constructivist approach should be used. Paying attention to the peculiarities of norms and acknowledging the influence of domestic policy on the norms, this approach allows to explain the differences in understanding sovereignty in different states. The political elites of Russia and China tend to consider that the strong central power secures the Westphalian sovereignty, while the historic experience of the US formed the ideal of decentralized power. Aiming at population protection, democracy promotion, terrorist persecution and maintaining US hegemony, American liberal internationalists and neocons are in general eager to step away from the traditional understanding of sovereignty. Russia and China consider sovereignty from the absolutist standpoint, though they have made a number of concessions to the changing norms of territorial integrity and humanitarian intervention. The article proves that the Russian, American and Chinese understanding of sovereignty (both domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty in S.Krasner’s terms) is changing with the emergence of common interests and the necessity to counteract new global threats.
Об автореCh. Ziegler
Соединённые Штаты Америки
1. See Maryann Cuisimano Love, Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, 4th edition (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010); Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and Colin L. Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, Issue 1 (January/February 2004), pp. 22–34.
2. Since realists take sovereignty as a given, most have devoted little attention to the concept. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 95–96. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001) does not discuss sovereignty at all.
3. Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
4. I recognize that in each country there are diverse schools of thought on international relations, and that these conflicting perspectives have variable impact on the foreign policy behaviors of their respective states. In this paper I am concerned not with delineating all the varieties of theoretical trends, but rather with identifying the dominant perspectives as reflected on official state policies.
5. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 3–4.
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13. Andrei Kokoshin quotes IR scholar Alexei Bogaturov and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to this effect. Kokoshin, pp. 18–19.
14. Kokoshin, p. 22.
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27. See the perceptive critique of both schools of thought by John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” The National Interest, No. 111 (January/February 2011), 16-34. Mearsheimer designates the liberal internationalist school as “liberal imperialists,” equating them with the neocons in their support for an American empire.
28. Mearsheimer calls for offshore balancing in three major areas of strategic interest — Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design.” Another major proponent of offshore balancing is Christopher Layne. See his “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Grand Strategy,” International Scurity, Vol. 22, No, 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124; and “America’s Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing has Arrived,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 1 (2009), pp. 5-25.
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34. The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians: Asia-Pacific in the UN Security Council, Update No. 1 (February 10, 2009), at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/PoC_Update_1%5B1%5D%5B1%5D.pdf, accessed May 23, 2011.
Для цитирования: Ziegler C. CONTRASTING U.S., CHINESE AND RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY. Сравнительная политика. 2012;3(1(7)):14-22. https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2012-3-1(7)-14-22
For citation: Ziegler C. CONTRASTING U.S., CHINESE AND RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY. Comparative Politics Russia. 2012;3(1(7)):14-22. https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2012-3-1(7)-14-22
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