

# ANALYSIS OF CHINESE NARRATIVE OF WORLD ORDER AND FOREIGN POLICY: IS CHINA A REVISIONIST OR REFORMIST POWER?

**Ka-Ho Wong**

*Independent Researcher, Hong Kong*

<p><b>Article history:</b></p> <p><i>Received:</i> 16 March 2018</p> <p><i>Accepted:</i> 8 May 2018</p>	<p><b>Abstract:</b> China has altered its global posture from “keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement” since President Xi came to power. The adjusted approach to Chinese foreign policy is in the context of growing China’s state capabilities and shrinking American global leadership under Trump’s presidency. Given these structural changes in the international system, China is expected to play a bigger role in the world politics. Accordingly, questions have raised that how China perceives the world and whether rising China is a reformist or revisionist power. The paper would address these questions by first revisiting the ancient Chinese idea of <i>Tianxia</i>, which is both a concept and practice in ancient times. As <i>Tianxia</i> is not applicable in the modern world, the concepts are reinvented by Chinese scholars, which are similar to ideas proposed by President Xi, offering an ideal worldview. In the third part, an empirical analysis of the Chinese foreign policy would check whether China’s behaviors correspond to Xi’s vision and whether China is a revisionist power.</p>
<p><b>About the author:</b> Independent Researcher; Freelance Writer, <i>Stand News</i>; MA Student, MGIMO University</p> <p>e-mail: <a href="mailto:frankywongk@gmail.com">frankywongk@gmail.com</a></p>	
<p><b>Key words:</b> Chinese worldview; <i>Tianxia</i>; confucianism; tributary system; Belt and Road; revisionist power; China threat</p>	

## Introduction

China has altered its global posture from “keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement” since President Xi came to power.<sup>1</sup> The adjusted approach to Chinese foreign policy is in the context of growing China’s state capabilities and shrinking American global leadership under Trump’s presidency. Given these structural changes in the international system, China is expected to play a bigger role in the world politics. Accordingly, questions have raised that how China perceives the world and whether rising China is a reformist or revisionist power. The paper would address these questions by first revisiting the ancient Chinese idea of *Tianxia*, which is both a concept and practice in ancient times. As *Tianxia* is not applicable in the modern world, the concepts are reinvented by Chinese scholars, which are similar to ideas proposed by President Xi,

offering an ideal worldview. In the third part, an empirical analysis of the Chinese foreign policy would check whether China’s behaviors correspond to Xi’s vision and whether China is a revisionist power.

## Ancient Chinese narrative of world order

First and foremost, this section illustrates the concept of *Tianxia*, which is the worldview and system of ancient Chinese. One would start from conceptualizing the definition of *Tianxia* and then the practice of *Tianxia* referring to the relations between ancient China and the peripheries. At the end of the section would illustrate the end of *Tianxia*.

### The concept of *Tianxia*

*Tianxia*, literally translated as the “all-under-heaven”, could refer to both ancient China and the whole world. *Tianxia*, in the narrow sense, is a Sinocentric concept referring to ancient China that is a civilizational state with Chinese culture. The superiority of

<sup>1</sup> Yan, X. From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement // *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2014, No. 7(2), pp. 153-184.

Chinese culture has ancient China positioned itself as the core of the concentric circles surpassing other civilizations. Thanks to the superior Chinese culture, ancient Chinese are the most civilized people and most capable of governing *Tianxia* under the principle of elite governance. Ancient China is surrounded by the peripheries when people living there are described by ancient Chinese as the barbarians, namely the “four barbarians” of the Dongyi, *Nanman*, *Xirong*, *Beidi*.

Ancient China could be understood as a network-based political and cultural community when the Chinese culture instead of descents act as the linkage within this community.<sup>2</sup> In this sense, *Tianxia* has no geographical limitation and is expandable by cultural assimilations when the peripheries become accustomed to the Chinese culture. There is a Chinese proverb illustrating the blurred boundary between ancient China and the peripheries that once the barbarians adapt to the Chinese culture, they become ancient Chinese. The ancient Chinese are confident to their culture that the peripheries would be assimilated into Chinese culture voluntarily through persistent cultural exchanges, which in some sense prevent inter-civilizational warfare. Therefore, in the broad sense, *Tianxia* is equivalent to the whole world consisting of ancient China plus the peripheries.<sup>3</sup>

#### Tianxia in practice

*Tianxia*, as explained consisting of the core and peripheries, is a hierarchical concept denoting the asymmetric status between ancient China and the surrounding states. In practice, ancient China managed to preserve harmonious relations with the peripheries because of Confucianism and tributary system.

Confucianism offers philosophical foundations to *Tianxia*, which help to create

<sup>2</sup> Zhao, T. *Tian xia zhi xu de wei lai xing* (The Future of the World Order) / *Tan suo yu zheng ming*, 2015, No. 11. Mode of access: [http://www.cssn.cn/zhx/zx\\_zhyj/201706/t20170629\\_3565234\\_22.shtml](http://www.cssn.cn/zhx/zx_zhyj/201706/t20170629_3565234_22.shtml)

<sup>3</sup> Wang, H.; Su, H. *Lun zhong xi wen ming zhong de tian xia guan he shi jie guan* (China and the West: Two Kinds of World Views) / *Zhong guo ren min da xue xue bao*, 2015, No. 1. Mode of access: [http://www.cssn.cn/zgs/zgs\\_zms/201601/t20160128\\_2847963.shtml](http://www.cssn.cn/zgs/zgs_zms/201601/t20160128_2847963.shtml)

relatively stable relations between ancient China and the peripheries. Confucianism emphasizes inclusiveness and harmony by encouraging the preservation of cultural differences and mutual interactions with other cultures. To be more precise, the Confucian's thoughts of harmony include the harmony between heaven and people (*tianren heyi*), the harmonious whole (*tianxia datong*), harmony in diversity (*he er bu tong*) and benevolent rule (*wangdao*). At the same time, Confucianism proposes the doctrine of the mean (*zhongyong*) that ways run parallel without interfering with one another. In practice, Confucianism demonstrates tolerance and coexists with other philosophies and religions. Thus, Confucianism proposes moral guidance to ancient China to peacefully deal with cultural differences between civilizations.<sup>4</sup> In contrast to the Western imperialism and colonialism, there is little inter-civilizational conflicts and no religious war ever initiated by ancient China for Confucianism. The emphasis of inclusiveness, harmony, and the mean in Confucianism is the fundamental element to maintain peace within *Tianxia*.

In the Chinese tributary system, countries are obligated to send tribute missions to ancient China regularly to develop economic relations with the Middle Kingdom. The Chinese tributary system shows the grace mentality ancient Chinese have given that ancient China is believed to be a self-sufficient economy. As a result, the economic relations between ancient China and the peripheries are asymmetric, even though both sides enjoy mutual benefits in trade. In exchange, the tributary entities would have political autonomy and security guarantee from ancient China against external threats. The practice of the peripheries paying tributes to ancient China is the external recognition of ancient China's cultural and economic predominance in the world, which also transforms to the legitimacy of the Chinese emperor domestically. Accordingly, the tributary system has ancient China enjoyed supreme status in the world without territorial expansions. Military forces are implemented

<sup>4</sup> Guo, Y. *Tian xia zhu yi: Shi jie zhi xu zhong jian de ru jia fang an* (Universalism: A Confucian Scheme for Reestablishing World Order) / *xue shu qian yan*, 2013, March, pp. 28-35.

only if the peripheries attempt to compete for ancient China's supreme status.

#### The end of *Tianxia*

Preserving the *Tianxia* nominally, the Qing dynasty delayed the end of *Tianxia* until the 19th century. The actual end of *Tianxia* refers to the termination of the ruling by Chinese civilization in ancient China, which could trace back to Qing dynasty when ancient China was no longer ruled by Chinese civilization but by Manchurian. Noteworthy is that the dynastic change in ancient China does not necessarily mean the real end of *Tianxia* as long as Chinese civilization still rules it. Nevertheless, the Qing emperors kept adopting the concept of *Tianxia* nominally for pragmatic reasons to maintain excellent diplomatic relations with other states. In the 19th century, the European imperialism put a complete end to *Tianxia* when the asymmetric diplomatic relations between ancient China and foreign countries are terminated and replaced by the Westphalian system of equal sovereignty.

#### *Tianxia* in the modern world

The revival of *Tianxia* in the 21st century would face severe challenges because of its characteristic of asymmetric diplomatic relations, which violate the international norm of equal sovereignty. *Tianxia* in the contemporary world implies a new hegemony of Chinese empire by revitalizing hierarchical diplomatic relations between China and other countries.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, new concepts are constructed by scholars to have *Tianxia* fit in the modern world and also by the Chinese leader to make China's influence continued to grow without confrontation with other great powers.

#### Neo-*Tianxia* and neo-cosmopolitanism

To have *Tianxia* integrated with the modern global norm and corresponded to China's global image, Chinese scholars have made modifications of *Tianxia* and developed

<sup>5</sup> Callahan, W.A. Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony? // *International Studies Review*, 2008, No. 10(4), pp. 749-761.

new concepts of the neo-*Tianxia* and neo-cosmopolitanism.

Neo-*Tianxia* proposes an ideal worldview that considers the whole world as one entity instead of the state-dominant vision, while posits China as a member of this community equally alongside with other countries.<sup>6</sup> The relations within neo-*Tianxia* are governed by the rules that are constructed mutually by the members based on consultations, compromises, and mutual trust. Meanwhile, neo-cosmopolitanism criticizes Sinocentrism of neo-*Tianxia* and suggests the trans-civilizational universalism which attempts to eliminate all centrism of civilizations.<sup>7</sup> Neo-cosmopolitanism highlights inter-cultural interactions and the universalism constructed by dialogues between civilizations. Respecting other civilizations and non-intervention are the critical conditions of neo-cosmopolitanism to seek common grounds while reserving differences (*qitong cunyi*).

The reinventions of *Tianxia* suggesting an idealistic world order imply the unrealistic assumption that human nature is good and are questionable in practice. Indeed, these new concepts are reinvented in the context of the 'harmonious world' outlined by the former Chinese President Hu and thus are regarded as propaganda to further China's agenda of "peaceful rise" and refute against the "China threat theory."

#### President Xi's worldview

As his predecessors proposing new conceptual ideas to represent their ruling, including Mao's "Mao Zedong Thought", Deng's "Deng Xiaoping Theory", Jiang's "Three Represents", and Hu's "Scientific Outlook on Development", Xi suggests the "Xi Jinping

<sup>6</sup> Ren, J. Zou xiang li xing: Jin dai yi lai zhong guo shi jie guan de shan bian (To Rationality: The Evolution of China's Worldview in Modern Times) / *Zhong yang she hui zhu yi xue yuan xue bao*, 2017, No. 2. Mode of access: <http://www.zysy.org.cn/a1/a-XCWE299B1DCCA1EE7C958C>

<sup>7</sup> Liu, Q. Zhong jian quan qiu xiang xiang: Cong "tian xia" li xiang zou xiang xin shi jie zhu yi (The Basic Connotation of Confucian Distinction between Righteousness and Benefit and Its Contemporary Significance) / *Xue shu yue kan*, 2015, No. 8. Mode of access: [http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail\\_forward\\_1379172](http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1379172)

Thought.” In the official document of the “Xi Jinping Thought”, it stresses the building of the “new type of international relations” and “community of shared destiny” when referring to the Chinese foreign policy.

To understand the “new type of international relations”, one should identify which countries the concept refers to and what is the new type of relations. Simply because the concept is a diplomatic term which is changing from time to time, there are little consensuses of its definition in the Chinese academic.<sup>8</sup> Compared to the “new type of great power relations”, which is used previously by the Chinese government to describe the Sino-American relations, the “new type of international relations” refers to China’s foreign relations in general and prioritizes the peripheral diplomacy. According to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the official discourse, the “new type of international relations” is defined as mutual respect and win-win cooperation.<sup>9</sup> In Chinese academic circles, the definition of the new type of relations could have broad understandings that could refer to the partnership, strategic competition, cooperation, and an ideological concept of harmony.

Alongside with the “new type of international relations”, President Xi repeatedly mentions the idea of the “community of shared destiny” during his speeches. The “community of shared destiny” could refer to three pillars of cooperative security, joint development, and political inclusiveness.<sup>10</sup> To begin with, China suggests the idea of cooperative security through consultations and collaborations with other countries to justify the morality and justice of the use of force. Secondly, the Chinese government

<sup>8</sup> Hao, Q. China Debates the “New Type of Great Power Relations”// *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2015, No. 8(4), pp. 349-370.

<sup>9</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. *zai 2017 nian guo ji xing shi yu zhong guo wai jiao yan tao hui kai mu shi shang de yan jiang* (Speech at the Opening of Symposium on International Developments and China’s Diplomacy in 2017). 2017, December 9. Mode of access: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjzbzd/t1518042.shtml>

<sup>10</sup> Fu, Y. *China’s Vision for the World: A Community of Shared Future*. 2017, June 22. Mode of access: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/chinas-vision-for-the-world-a-community-of-shared-future/>

proposes the BRI to address inequality of global economic development and help the developing countries to catch up the development level of the developed world. Moreover, thirdly, China shows mutual respect and tolerances to other cultures and civilizations.

Overall, the “new type of international relations” and “community of shared destiny” proposed by the Chinese government are vague concepts. The construction of these concepts aims at setting a unique model to the world that is with Chinese characteristic and different from the traditional Western concepts.<sup>11</sup> However, unlike *Tianxia* which is both a concept and practice in ancient times, neo-*Tianxia*, neo-cosmopolitanism, and Xi’s ideas are yet to be materialized. The harmonious worldview offered by Chinese scholars and leader are symbolic as long as in reality, China is growing aggressive in the global arena, especially for the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

### Contemporary Chinese foreign policy

After illustrating the conceptual framework of Chinese worldview, the essay would analyze China’s tools of diplomacy in practice, from the perspective of economics, institutions, and culture. The empirical analysis of Chinese foreign policy not only testifies China’s vision suggested by Xi but also answers the role of rising China in the international system.

#### Economic diplomacy

Thanks to the growing economic capabilities as being the world’s second-largest economy, the Chinese government is more dedicated to manipulating its economic resources to influence the international relations. China has the dual transformation of economic diplomacy that Beijing has now concerned also about external environment plus shaping norms and agendas in the global economy when formulating its economic policies.<sup>12</sup> In practice,

<sup>11</sup> Gao, C. “A Community of Shared Future”: One Short Phrase for UN, One Big Victory for China? 2017, November 5. Mode of access: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/a-community-of-shared-future-one-short-phrase-for-un-one-big-victory-for-china/>

<sup>12</sup> Ren, J. “Shuang zhong zhuan xing”: shi ba da yi

China adopts the carrot and stick approach by offering rewards of economic liberalization and punishments of economic sanctions to induce desired policies of other countries.

To begin with, China offers positive inducements of economic liberalization in trade, finance, and investment to buy other countries' supports. The Chinese government is motivated to conclude more FTAs with key trading partners and neighboring countries, which helped China to facilitate economic cooperation and develop the strategic partnership with other countries and regions.<sup>13</sup> China is also enthusiastic about regional integration projects, namely the FTAAP and RCEP. Financially, China is one of the world's largest donors offering money mainly to countries which support them at the United Nations, especially the African countries.<sup>14</sup> At the same time, China has soared its foreign investment abroad under the "Go Out policy" and the BRI. The "Go Out Policy" has been pushed by the Chinese government since 1999 to urge the Chinese enterprises to invest in global markets and since 2014 China's outward foreign investment has surpassed its inward foreign investment.

The "Go Out Policy" has evolved to the next level under President Xi's leadership with his flagship of the BRI. President Xi announced the BRI in 2013, which emphasizes infrastructure connectivity and is participated by more than 65 countries from Asia, Europe, and Africa. When the BRI helps China to address the domestic economic issue of overcapacity and unbalanced development among Chinese regions, the initiative also provides other BRI countries with much-needed investments for

lai zhong guo jing ji wai jiao de li nian chuang xin yu zhan lue bu ju ("Dual Transformation": The Concept Innovation and Strategic Layout of China's Economic Diplomacy since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China) / *Zhong guo yu shi jie*, 2015. Mode of access: <http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-CAWD201500004.htm>

<sup>13</sup> Pan, X. China's FTA Strategy. 2014, June 1. Mode of access: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-fta-strategy/>

<sup>14</sup> Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset / AidData Working Paper No. 46. 2018, March 16. Mode of access: <http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset>

development, particularly the Asian countries facing the infrastructure gap. The Chinese government's push for the BRI would have geopolitical implications that China would gain greater political leverages to the participating countries from peripheral regions, let alone the initiative itself could be the globalization 3.0 with Chinese characteristics in parallel with the one that driven by the West.

Apart from rewarding friendly countries with economic liberalization, China uses economic weapons to punish countries that challenge "China's core interests." Although Beijing has defined sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic development as "China's core interests", the interpretation by the Chinese government have been arbitrary and flexible from time to time.<sup>15</sup> The overuse of these words by the Chinese foreign ministry constitutes a pressure or blackmail to other countries in changing their policies. Countries that are reluctant to compromise would risk deteriorating economic relations with China. For instance, last year China imposed economic sanctions on South Korean products in revenge for Seoul's deployment of THAAD missile defense system. Indeed, China was used to manipulate economic activities in response to human rights' criticisms, including the imposition of economic boycotts to European countries whose leader met with Dalai Lama and to Norway during the Nobel Prize Dispute. China's manipulation of economic weapons has exploited the current rule-based system and brought severe damages to China's image abroad.

#### Institutional diplomacy

There are two dimensions of China's institutional diplomacy, concerning the increased participation in the existing multilateral institutions and establishment of new institutions. The first dimension that China has greater engagement with the international organizations is following the logic that if China cannot beat the Western-led institutions,

<sup>15</sup> Swaine, M.D. China's Assertive Behavior Part One: On "Core Interests" // *China Leadership Monitor*, 2010, No. 34. Mode of access: [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM34MS\\_FINAL.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM34MS_FINAL.pdf)

join them. As a result, China joins the WTO and G20 and seeks for reforms to have a more significant say in the existing international organizations, such as in the IMF. Meanwhile, China demonstrates its bold ambitions to advance its national interests by creating new multilateral institutions. Following the logic of counter-hegemonic institutionalism, building new Chinese-led institutions helps China to facilitate reforms and boost its influences in the existing organizations and to form the basis of the rival international order by propagating new norms and rules.<sup>16</sup> The Chinese government has learned a lesson from the U.S. which uses the international organizations as an instrument of the American policy for preserving its global powers and legitimizing its interests abroad. Building its international institutions to protect Chinese interests overseas is also pragmatic given that there are increasing Chinese businesses investing abroad under the “Go Out Policy.” Accordingly, China has created the AIIB and NDB that provide Beijing with larger influences in setting discourses in the international economic governance. Still, under the multilateralism, the participation of other countries could give an institutional check to China’s behavior within the new organizations.

#### Public and cultural diplomacy

While China’s economic and institutional diplomacy is the Chinese foreign policy adventures at times, the Chinese government uses the public and cultural diplomacy to downplay China’s aggressive image abroad. The Chinese public diplomacy aims at improving China’s national image and global influences with soft power. One of the essential tools of the Chinese public diplomacy is the Confucius Institute which promotes Chinese languages and cultures in foreign universities but faces growing backlashes concerning its political influences. The Chinese government also concentrates on spreading China’s cultural influences in the mass media and on the internet

although the outcome is far from satisfactory. On the one hand, the mass media is dominated by the Western media, especially those from the English-speaking countries. On the other hand, the lack of freedom of speech and press plus media censorship in China becomes a fundamental limitation for the Chinese media to expand its influences in the globe.

The cultural diplomacy has a crucial position in China’s push of the BRI. According to the official document, one of the five development priorities highlighted in the BRI is the people-to-people bonds referring to cultural exchanges among the BRI countries. Some countries perceive the BRI as China’s geopolitical adventures based on its geopolitical implications and the fact that Beijing fails to explain the initiative thoroughly which leaves China’s intentions to remain uncertain. The perception of the BRI refers to the combination between China’s image and public opinion, which are shaped by political, economic and cultural factors.<sup>17</sup> China’s cultural diplomacy in the BRI aims at undermining “China threat” sentiment in the short-term and creating favorable image of China in the long-term.<sup>18</sup> In practice, the Chinese government could utilize cultural diplomacy in different areas, including education, tourism, technology, and health. Sound cultural diplomacy would help China to implement the BRI smoothly by improving international understanding and undermining its geopolitical meanings.

#### A revisionist or reformist power?

All in all, though China is aggressively seeking for more significant influences in the international system, the Chinese government is yet to be a revisionist state desired for revising the status quo. Undoubtedly, Beijing is boldly expanding its influences abroad by economic and institutional diplomacy, when China’s

<sup>17</sup> Cheng, Y. Public Opinions on the Belt and Road Initiative: A Cross-cultural Study. In *The BRI in the global arena: Chinese and European perspectives*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Pp. 3-15.

<sup>18</sup> Song, L.; Zhao, Q. A Model for the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Cultural Diplomacy Toward Central and Eastern European Countries. In *The BRI in the global arena: Chinese and European perspectives*. 2018, pp. 55-68.

<sup>16</sup> Ikenberry, G.J.; Lim, D.J. China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Prospects for Counter-Hegemony. 2017. Mode of access: <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/chinas-emerging-institutional-statecraft.pdf>

behaviors in the South China Seas Dispute, the implementation of economic sanctions and creation of new international institutions are aggression. However, the Chinese government is satisfied with the liberal global order, which offers a stable external environment for China's development. At the same time, China has to rely on other participants and great powers in implementing the BRI provided that there have security challenges along the routes. Therefore, although China is improving its capabilities in building an alternative world order, the Chinese government is yet to be capable of and not determined to challenge the U.S.'s global leadership. China's relatively failed public and cultural diplomacy is one of the reasons that has Beijing labeled as a revisionist power.

## Conclusion

It could conclude that Tianxia is an expandable concept that could refer to ancient China and the whole world at the same time. *Tianxia*, considering the world as a community, transcends the state-dominant international order and is a relatively stable system thanks to Confucianism and the tributary system. *Tianxia* is not applicable in the modern world given that the asymmetric relations in *Tianxia* are in contrast with equal sovereignty under the Westphalian system. New concepts reinventing *Tianxia*, including neo-*Tianxia* and neo-cosmopolitanism by Chinese scholars, and vague ideas proposed by Xi are yet to materialize. Based on the analysis of Chinese foreign policies, China is aggressively seeking for more significant influences in the international system economically and institutionally. China is far from being a revisionist state considering its lack of capabilities and determination to take the global leadership. The unsatisfying Chinese public diplomacy, which fails to improve China's image abroad, costs China to be labeled as the revisionist power.

## References:

- Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset / AidData Working Paper No. 46. 2018, March 16. Mode of access: <http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset>
- Callahan, W.A. Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony? // *International Studies Review*, 2008, No. 10(4), pp. 749-761.
- Cheng, Y. Public Opinions on the Belt and Road Initiative: A Cross-cultural Study. In *The BRI in the global arena: Chinese and European perspectives*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Pp. 3-15.
- Fu, Y. China's Vision for the World: A Community of Shared Future. 2017, June 22. Mode of access: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/chinas-vision-for-the-world-a-community-of-shared-future/>
- Gao, C. "A Community of Shared Future": One Short Phrase for UN, One Big Victory for China? 2017, November 5. Mode of access: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/a-community-of-shared-future-one-short-phrase-for-un-one-big-victory-for-china/>
- Guo, Y. Tian xia zhu yi: Shi jie zhi xu zhong jian de ru jia fang an (Universalism: A Confucian Scheme for Reestablishing World Order) / *xue shu qian yan*, 2013, March, pp. 28-35.
- Hao, Q. China Debates the "New Type of Great Power Relations" // *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2015, No. 8(4), pp. 349-370.
- Ikenberry, G.J.; Lim, D.J. China's Emerging Institutional Statecraft: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Prospects for Counter-Hegemony. 2017. Mode of access: <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/chinas-emerging-institutional-statecraft.pdf>
- Liu, Q. Zhong jian quan qiu xiang xiang: Cong "tian xia" li xiang zou xiang xin shi jie zhu yi (The Basic Connotation of Confucian Distinction between Righteousness and Benefit and Its Contemporary Significance) / *Xue shu yue kan*, 2015, No. 8. Mode of access: [http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail\\_forward\\_1379172](http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1379172)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. zai 2017 nian guo ji xing shi yu zhong guo wai jiao yan tao hui kai mu shi shang de yan jiang (Speech at the Opening of Symposium on International Developments and China's Diplomacy in 2017). 2017, December 9. Mode of access: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjzbhd/t1518042.shtml>
- Pan, X. China's FTA Strategy. 2014, June 1. Mode of access: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-fta-strategy/>
- Ren, J. "Shuang zhong zhuan xing": shi ba da yi lai zhong guo jing ji wai jiao de li nian chuang xin yu zhan lue bu ju ("Dual Transformation": The Concept Innovation and Strategic Layout of China's Economic Diplomacy since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China) / *Zhong guo yu shi jie*, 2015. Mode of access: <http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-CAWD201500004.htm>
- Ren, J. Zou xiang li xing: Jin dai yi lai zhong guo shi jie guan de shan bian (To Rationality: The Evolution of China's Worldview in Modern Times) / *Zhong yang she hui zhu yi xue yuan xue bao*, 2017, No. 2. Mode of access: <http://www.zysy.org.cn/a1/a-XCWE299B1DCCA1EE7C958C>
- Song, L.; Zhao, Q. A Model for the Belt and Road Initiative: China's Cultural Diplomacy Toward Central and Eastern European Countries. In *The BRI in the global arena: Chinese and European perspectives*. 2018, pp. 55-68.
- Swaine, M.D. China's Assertive Behavior Part One: On "Core Interests" // *China Leadership Monitor*, 2010, No. 34. Mode of access: [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM34MS\\_FINAL.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM34MS_FINAL.pdf)
- Wang, H.; Su, H. Lun zhong xi wen ming zhong de tian xia guan he shi jie guan (China and the West: Two Kinds of World Views) / *Zhong guo ren min da xue xue bao*, 2015, No. 1. Mode of access: [http://www.cssn.cn/zgs/zgs\\_zms/201601/t20160128\\_2847963.shtml](http://www.cssn.cn/zgs/zgs_zms/201601/t20160128_2847963.shtml)

Yan, X. From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement // *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2014, No. 7(2), pp. 153-184.

Zhao, T. Tian xia zhi xu de wei lai xing (The Future of the World Order) / *Tan suo yu zheng ming*, 2015, No. 11. Mode of access: [http://www.cssn.cn/zhx/zx\\_zhyj/201706/t20170629\\_3565234\\_22.shtml](http://www.cssn.cn/zhx/zx_zhyj/201706/t20170629_3565234_22.shtml)

<http://dx.doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2017-9-3-154-161>

## АНАЛИЗ КИТАЙСКИХ ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИЙ МИРОВОГО ПОРЯДКА И ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ: ЯВЛЯЕТСЯ ЛИ КИТАЙ РЕВИЗИОНИСТСКОЙ ИЛИ РЕФОРМИСТСКОЙ ДЕРЖАВОЙ?

Ка-Хо Вонг

*Независимый исследователь, Гонконг*

<p><b>Информация о статье:</b> <i>Поступила в редакцию:</i> 16 марта 2018 <i>Принята к печати:</i> 18 мая 2018</p>	<p><b>Аннотация:</b> После того как Си Цзиньпин пришел к власти, Китай сменил свою глобальную стратегию «незаметной дипломатии» на активную дипломатическую деятельность, нацеленную на достижение реальных результатов. Скорректированный подход к китайской внешней политике укладывается в контекст роста потенциала Китая и постепенного сокращения американского глобального лидерства. Учитывая структурные изменения в системе международных отношений, Китай, как ожидается, будет играть более значительную роль в мировой политике. Вопрос заключается в том, каким образом Китай воспринимает мир и выступает ли он в качестве реформистской или ревизионистской державы. В статье рассматриваются эти вопросы, прежде всего, на основе осмысления древнекитайской идеи «Тяньши» («Поднебесная»), которая являлась одновременно и философской концепцией, и основой практической политики. Хотя концепция Поднебесной к настоящему времени утрачивала свое значение, к ней снова стали обращаться китайские ученые, сопоставляя сущность данной концепции с идеями, предложенными президентом Си Цзиньпином. В статье также проводится эмпирический анализ китайской внешней политики с целью определения, соответствует ли реальная внешнеполитическая деятельность Китая видению Си Цзиньпина и является ли Китай ревизионистской державой.</p>
<p><b>Об авторе:</b> Независимый исследователь; независимый автор, <i>Stand News</i>; магистрант, МГИМО МИД России  e-mail: frankywongk@gmail.com</p>	
<p><b>Ключевые слова:</b> китайское мировоззрение; <i>Tianxia</i>; Поднебесная; конфуцианство; трибутарная система; Инициатива пояса и пути; ревизионистская держава; китайская угроза</p>	

*Для цитирования:* Wong, Ka-Ho. Analysis of Chinese Narrative of World Order and Foreign Policy: Is China a Revisionist or Reformist Power? // *Сравнительная политика*. – 2018. – № 3. – С. 154-161.

DOI: 10.18611/2221-3279-2018-9-3-154-161

*For citation:* Wong, Ka-Ho. Analysis of Chinese Narrative of World Order and Foreign Policy: Is China a Revisionist or Reformist Power? // *Comparative Politics Russia*, 2018, No. 3, pp. 154-161.

DOI: 10.18611/2221-3279-2018-9-3-154-161